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Abstract 
The post-communist assessment of communist youth transitions to work is at risk of 
exaggerating the assumption of previously existing predefined and predictable 
channels into work. In order to allow a somewhat refined picture of the Soviet case 
the paper reviews the main ways, in which the Soviet system tried to take hold of 
young people as a human resource. They were subject to labour planning and job 
placement as well as education for labour. The meeting point of these two 
mechanisms, i.e. the intersection of labour planning and educational transitions, left 
considerable space for informal job matching. After introducing and discussing early 
roots and main institutions of Soviet labour planning, the Soviet version of educating 
for labour including its institutional backbone, the three-track system of education and 
its main destinations, is reviewed. Finally, the mechanisms and shortcomings of post-
educational youth placement in the USSR are discussed. The evidence indicates that, 
on the one hand, educational determinism is untenable - first, due to the relative status 
of education within the whole complex of transition arrangements, and second due to 
the fact that outcome assumptions and expectations attached to the idealised internal 
and external 'role' of certain tracks were thwarted by its incompatibility with the 
economy's actual manpower needs. On the other hand, institutional determinism is 
untenable because the reality of matching processes obviously involved a 
considerable degree of agency on the part of individuals. The concluding remarks plea 
for a reassessment of youth transitions also in market contexts. 
Keywords 
USSR, Soviet Union, education, school, labour, work, unemployment, transition, 
youth, young people. 
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1 
Introduction 
The institutional establishment of predictable links between young people's education 
and their labour market entry has never been complete - neither in 'welfare capitalist 
countries' where the state generally controls education but employment is allocated 
according to market mechanisms, nor in communist countries where it was through 
central planning that the 'close functional fit between labour demand and labour 
supply' was expected (Wallace/Kovatcheva 1998: 85-86). While it seems easy to 
accept shortcomings of matching mechanisms in the context of market democracies, it 
is more difficult to associate them with the general image of socialism.1 One source of 
possible misunderstanding with regard to the latter is the relationship between 
ideological underpinning and organisational features as well as actual behaviour. 
Different from democratic societies this dual relationship has been explicit in socialist 
societies, but, as I argue in this paper, far from flawless. Refined knowledge of the 
shape this relationship assumed is crucial for an understanding of where it will 
possibly develop. 
Also the post-communist assessment of communist youth transitions to work is at risk 
of exaggerating the assumption of previously existing predefined and predictable 
channels into work. The directions of potential misconception are manifold; I restrict 
myself here to two variations of such an idealisation. First, the significance or primacy 
of education in the Soviet context tends to be neither questioned nor relativised 
('educational fallacy'). Second, the stereotypical image of (young) people under 
socialism tends to assume their passivity and heteronomy vis-à-vis institutional 
arrangements ('institutional fallacy'). Obviously these two strands of argumentation 
that are exemplified in the following can go hand in hand.2 
First, the study of youth transitions into the world of work in Western market-based 
economies is characterised by a strong assumption of a primacy of education over 
labour market outcomes. It is believed, and empirically substantiated, 'that educational 
systems define occupational opportunities for individuals at entry into the labour 
market' (Allmendinger (1989: 232; original emphasis).3 Yet, this postulate, a good 
hypothesis usually, seems to narrow down the ex-post perspective on the Soviet case. 
For the sake of hypothesis formulation in the context of quantitative post-communist 
youth transition research as it were, the usually brief and formulaic reviews of the 
former Soviet educational system and the mechanisms of allocation emphasise their 
strongly deterministic character (Toomse 2003: 271-272; Kogan/Unt 2005: 225; Saar 
2005: 519). Where the discussion of the education system is granted more space these 
features are exaggerated and variations in outcome are attributed to differences in the 
organisation of education in the Soviet republics (Titma/Saar 1995, Saar 1997). 
Alternatively, as it seems difficult to acknowledge effects of meritocratic features in 
the context of a command economy sometimes despite clues in the data, education has 
the status of an important but essentially empty label in a society where job 
assignments are considered comprehensive and mobility state-sponsored and, thus, 
subjected to the arbitrariness of the party and its agents (Titma et al. 2003). Gerber 
                                                 
1
 I use of the terms ‘socialist/socialism’ respectively ‘communist/communism’ somewhat arbitrarily 
and without referring to distinctions that are relevant for certain academic discourses (e.g. Kornai 1992: 
9-11). 
2
 Strictly speaking, the first is a special case of the second. 
3
 Many references could be listed here to exemplify this approach; for one recent and indicative article 
see Müller (2005).  
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(2003), on the other hand, prefers to additionally emphasise the effects of a 
'credential-based labour market' in the Soviet Union (ibid: 245-246) – with markets 
requiring the changeable weight of some kind of utility value attached to individuals. 
Studying the link between educational attainment and first occupational class in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia he cannot, within the limits of his approach, find 
evidence of dramatically different transition patterns despite institutional change. In 
view of this persistence of stratification patterns throughout the societal and 
institutional transformation he finally recommends the consideration of 
'noninstitutional factors' like 'specific policies shaping the structure of incentives for 
different courses of action' (ibid. 270). From my point of view all these examples of 
assessing the Soviet context suffer from an inadequate universalisation of the time 
line (of the individual transition) implicit in the notion 'school-to-work'. What 
constitutes an 'educational fallacy' is exactly the premature and retrospective 
inference of causal relations from the standpoint of currently fruitful 'Western' 
hypotheses with regard to the education-employment association to Soviet contexts.4 
A second form of misconception in post-communism research apparently consists in 
mistaking the institutional arrangements as defining individual action. In general this 
question addresses the dualism of structure and agency that is at the core of 
sociological research. For instance, Goffman (1990) writes programmatically about 
the behaviour and knowledge of participants in 'total institutions': 'Whenever worlds 
are laid on, underlives develop' (ibid: 305). People find alternative ways to 'work the 
system' (210) and to make 'secondary adjustments' (189). Without necessarily 
equating the socialist, or here: Soviet system with a total institution it is obvious that 
the systemic inconsistency between ideological as well as organisational 
superstructure and the sphere of experiences needs to be taken into consideration - an 
omnipresent phenomenon that could be called 'duality of socialist reality'. The 
common tendency to consider institutions and ideologies as omnipotent explanatory 
factors of the functionality of the socialist system and the action of its people, readily 
reproduces the 'normative-ideological semantics' of a socialist society itself, as 
Wingens (1999: 274) puts it in his review of the GDR case; yet, it falls short in 
describing socialist realities. Contrasting the job allocation guidelines with realities of 
job transitions in the GDR on the basis of a longitudinal study of graduates from 
university and apprenticeship of the year 1985, Wingens (ibid.) finds that there were 
many ways of circumventing the straitjacket of official allocation mechanisms. 
Qualitative material shows that people knew well how to make use of networks, 
informal contacts etc. in order to get closer to their own ideas of what, how, and 
where they wanted to work. Despite the factual validity and relevance of the 
'semantics of command economy' for both action and reflection upon society, people 
were by no means passive, heteronomous or incompetent to take action. Even if it 
were common to rationalise one's own experiences as exceptions to the rule, it would 
be erroneous to assume individual transitions to have followed the logic of 
predictability only. This rare example of methodically innovative post-communist 
research into communism5 confronts idealised transition structures with actual 
                                                 
4
 I included here only references that deal with post-Soviet countries. Research covering other post-
communist countries includes, for instance, Bynner/Koklyagina (1995), Roberts (1998), Roberts/Fagan 
(1999), Sackmann et al. (2000), Kovacheva (2001), Matthes (2002), Robert/Bukodi (2002), Katus et al. 
(2002). Some of the arguments would apply also to these contributions. 
5
 Methodological alternatives for a possible refinement of research in order to overcome fallacies like 
these are discussed in Kelle (2001). 
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transition experiences and convincingly exposes potential pitfalls of disregarding 
unintended and 'non-institutional' features on the level of biographical action. What 
constitutes an 'institutional fallacy', to use a term introduced by Allport (1927), is the 
reproduction of ideologically suggested features of the former system by stressing the 
primacy of institutional arrangements over individual action. 
These two potential modes of misconception of the socialist past of societies in 
transformation and its significance for the ongoing transformation indicate a grey area 
of research. There is no doubt that the command economy incorporated a 
comprehensive system of planning and administrative placement. Yet its factual 
overall relevance is contested and the control of the allocation of labour would never 
reach the rigour of the system of planning in the area of industrial production. Many 
work relations were constituted by 'hirings at the gate' and therefore beyond direct 
state control, which accounted for a comparatively small share of job allocations. On 
the other hand, the assignment system did have importance for school to work 
transitions of young people because direct influence was applied by placing graduates 
from educational establishments. But also here, the impact of institutional 
arrangements remains largely undetermined in its scope and unreflected in its 
significance for the current transformation. Simplifying assumptions about the 
features of the system ultimately feed into hypothesis of current research into post-
communist youth transitions and run risk of doing a disservice to both research and 
subjects. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the closing of this knowledge gap by re-
assessing the particular transitions of Soviet youths. An analysis of the issue for the 
Soviet case along hypotheses derived from the two dimensions indicated above is 
impossible due to lack of appropriate data. Instead, I want to present, discuss and 
evaluate available evidence along these two lines. In this way the evidence remains 
open, invites for alternative interpretation and should allow the refinement of starting 
points for research and the generation of alternative hypothesis. Arguments referring 
to each of the two dimensions are not presented separately; obvious institutional as 
well as educational shortcomings contrast the alleged features of the system at all 
levels. In this sense, the paper reviews the main ways, in which the Soviet system 
tried to take hold of young people as a human resource. They were subject to labour 
planning and job placement as well as – subsidiarily I would argue – education for 
labour. The meeting point of these two mechanisms, i.e. the intersection of labour 
planning and educational preparation, established a space for youth transitions where 
considerable informal ways of job matching are evident. 
The argument is organised into three steps: First, the early roots and the main 
institutions of Soviet labour planning as long-term consequences of the political 
commitment to full employment and its relevance for young people are discussed. In a 
second step, the Soviet version of educating for labour including its institutional 
backbone, the three-track system of education and its main destinations, is reviewed. 
In a third and final step I discuss the mechanisms and shortcomings of post-
educational youth placement in the USSR. The tentative conclusion assesses the 
evidence presented against the background of the two potential fallacies indicated. On 
the one hand, I argue that educational determinism is unsustainable - first, due to the 
relative status of education within the whole complex of transition arrangements, and 
second due to the fact that outcome assumptions and expectations attached to the 
idealised internal and external 'role' of certain tracks were thwarted by its 
incompatibility with the economy's actual manpower needs. On the other hand, 
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institutional determinism is unsustainable because the reality of matching processes 
obviously involved considerable activity on the part of individuals. Yet, the 
assessment of the scope of agency is more difficult as original (qualitative) empirical 
evidence is not available here. 
Two qualifications need to be made. First, I depend on work done by individual, 
mainly Western scholars. This is for reasons of language and in order to avoid official 
Soviet sources of dubious quality by relying on more competent filters. Second, the 
argument sometimes needs to generalise as variations in terms of space and time 
cannot be fully integrated here. Needless to say, I cannot, like Kornai (1992) in his 
phenomenology of the 'classical socialist system', provide a prototypical 
representation of an 'intertemporal average' (ibid: 21). Some of the points made have 
general validity, most refer to the time of the 1970s to the mid 1980s. Besides, the late 
educational reforms adopted in 1984 and 1988 have never been fully implemented. 
Labour planning in the USSR – its early roots and its short breath 
Early roots and main institutions 
Unemployment that had accompanied the 'New Economic Policy' was a massive 
problem in Soviet Russia during the 1920s, both socially and politically. Its 
eradication in the first year of the succeeding decade, which had consequently been 
exploited as an intended political success and future key feature of Soviet society, 
actually came as a 'surprise' and side product of other measures introduced earlier to 
tighten the labour discipline, especially the abolition of unemployment benefits 
(Christian 1985). In the official discourse, however, it was during the autumn of the 
year 1930 when the final steps towards the 'complete elimination of unemployment' 
were taken by Soviet leaders. Key officials of the (supposedly unsuccessful) the 
People's Commissariat of labour, were removed from their positions and unemployed 
persons refusing to take any job offer were removed from the register. The terms 
'labour exchange' and 'labour market' were declared inappropriate and the need to 
strengthen the element of planned control was emphasised (Davis 1986). Already at 
the end of the year 1930 the labour exchanges were turned into institutions of labour 
administration; 'systematic estimates and the planned distribution of available 
manpower' were their main tasks. Finally, in order to control the flow of rural labour 
into industrial urban areas the decision to establish a labour-recruiting organisation 
(Orgnabor) covering rural areas was taken in 1931. From that time on the idea of 
controlled labour allocation was institutionalised and the moment of planning labour 
remained central to both the Soviet economy as well as the self-understanding of 
socialism as a superior form of economic organisation.6  
Issues of labour mobility were subject to a changeful development in the history of 
the USSR. Without being able to go into detail here some rough indication shall be 
given: In the 1940s the level of restrictions applied on labour mobility was at its peak. 
In view of the coming war (in the USSR from 1941) labour legislation got more and 
more restrictive and quitting a job without the employer's permission was denied and, 
                                                 
6
 Despite the questionable success of planned recruitment and the unbroken importance of traditional 
forms of hiring, the superiority of the system was maintained ideologically. As Manevich (1982: 248) 
writes in his article on 'labor' for the 'Great Soviet Encyclopedia': The planned nature of labor 
organization is the most important feature of socialist labor and its great advantage over capitalist 
labor.' 
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for the first time, criminalised.7 Only in the mid-1950s (under Khrushchev) labour 
relations were liberalised to an extent that (voluntary) mobility between jobs could be 
initiated individually and transfers to another job needed the worker's approval. This 
was the beginning of labour turnover in the Soviet Union. A rather incentive-based 
but finally not successful labour policy was maintained from the mid-1960s (under 
Brezhnev). Only at the end of the 1970s the administrative control was tightened and 
labour quotas were reintroduced. In the 1980s attempts were made to raise the 
working morals and labour mobility was again restricted; the complex and multi-
dimensional problem of labour shortage remained subject to many different and even 
competing policies depending on which kind of causal attribution for shortage was 
favoured (Oxenstierna 1990, Malle 1987).8 
Once unemployment had been abolished full employment started to have the status of 
an irreversible 'acquired right' of the worker (Kornai 1992: 210). The reason for 
maintaining this policy was a self-reinforcing pattern, as Baxandall (2003, also 2004) 
notes in his study of socialist Hungary. A 'communist taboo against unemployment' in 
ideological, economic and political terms was a derivative of rational choices that kept 
the full employment strategy alive. Officials, leaders and workers could equally 
support the norm against unemployment because they all profited from its 
maintenance and none of them had an interest in abandoning full employment 
commonly defined as 'success'. Consequently, the sphere of work was, beside its 
ideological weight, institutionally central to socialist societies. The right and 
obligation (later: duty)9 to labour for both men and women - the latter additionally 
having the family responsibilities - was explicit in the constitutions of the USSR. 
Employment of any kind was guaranteed by the Soviet regime, both ideologically and 
practically. 
The constitutional guarantee to 'satisfactory' work was difficult to meet and resulted in 
a fundamental contradiction between the ideal of work and the work experiences of 
millions of former peasants that were forced to work in factories in the course of the 
industrialisation and modernisation of the country. Work was an individual necessity 
performed collectively that obliged the individual to contribute to the economic 
growth of the country, to the national income and to the reproduction of society. The 
reality of working life had little in common with the ideologically suggested 
dimensions of work and its factual importance as the main institution for social 
integration. The productivity of Soviet labour was low and the 'relaxed working pace' 
was one of the concessions of the state in its 'tacit social contract' with the workers 
                                                 
7
 For an account of pre-war Soviet employment and labour policy of the first five-year plans see Barber 
(1986). See Filtzer (1986: chapter 9) for the 'Edict of 26 June 1940' attaching sanctions of criminal law 
to labour violations as well for responses to restrictive labour law. For an account of the even more 
restrictive labour force policy under Stalin after the war involving all sorts of forced labour including 
teenagers in labour-training schools see Filtzer (2002). 
8
 It is important to emphasise that gender was a crucial category in Soviet labour management. Without 
being able to address this issue here it should just be noted that the status of women as a resource of 
labour was variable and depended, perhaps more strongly than that of men, on the economic situation. 
The basic distinction between male and female 'tasks' in economy and family was made in the course of 
the first five-year plans and the 'double-burden' of women in work and household was notorious. 
Throughout the whole Soviet history women were forced into a multiple set of roles including that of 
the worker/breadwinner, mother, childrearer, and housewife (e.g. Christian 1985, Buckley 1988, Sacks 
1988, Ashwin 2000, Goldman 2002). 
9
 For this distinction see Lane (1986: 2). 
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(Piirainen 1997: 88-93).10 Also the socialising capacity of work and work organisation 
under socialism needs to be assessed carefully; it is at least ambivalent. Romanticising 
notions of responsible work communities are contrasted by the instrumental character 
of the cohesion within workers' collectives and the dissociation and alienation from 
the actual work activities (for the GDR see: Kohli 1994: 49-51). 
Full employment and efficient allocation of labour according to economic needs were 
the overall goals of Soviet employment policy.11 At least according to the ideal of 
Soviet control of resources, the implementation of the guidelines of the union-wide 
centralised five-year plans was supervised by Gosplan, the State Committee for 
Planning.12 Labour planning was part of the overall planning system (Yampolsky 
1952). In practice, Gosplan reacted to requests by Ministries, industrial enterprises 
and other employers. The flow of workers between economic branches and different 
republics was co-ordinated according to so-called 'labour balances', which estimated 
the relationship between labour supply, demand and sectoral distribution. On the level 
of the Soviet Republics corresponding Republican State Committees on the Use of 
Labour Resources were established with subordinate agencies of Orgnabor (Lane 
1987: chapter 3). 
The organisational units of the job placement system were subordinate to different 
departments and institutions. Organised recruitment, agricultural 'resettlement', youth 
employment and organised job placement service were subordinate to the State 
Committee for Labour and Social Problems (Goskomtrud). Job transfers as well as the 
distribution of graduates from the education system were under the authority of 
different ministries and agencies and assisted by the Komsomol. Social security 
institutions tried to find jobs for the disabled and 'internal affairs agencies' were 
responsible for the placement of former convicts (Kotliar 1984: 23-24). 
In 1969 job placement bureaux (JPB), Soviet employment agencies co-ordinated by 
state planning agencies were reopened in order to facilitate job matching and to assist 
retraining and labour transfers.13 These agencies were supposed to supplement 
recruitment by enterprises and to bring parts of this 'grey area' of job allocation back 
under state control (Kotliar 1984: 30-32). First they operated only in bigger cities of 
Soviet Russia, but were subsequently established in almost half of the cities with more 
than 50.000 inhabitants, approaching a number of 2000 by the end of the 1980s. JPB 
were important especially because of their monopoly of information and placement.14 
                                                 
10
 The common problem of motivation, productivity and work organisation as well as other features 
and shortcomings of work organisation are for instance discussed in Pietsch (1986), Rutland (1986), 
Lane (1987: chapter 5), Arnot (1988: chapter 4); Rainnie et al. (2002). For insider perspectives on low 
productivity, redundant labour, the problems of alcoholism and absenteeism see Gregory (1987). 
11
 For example, Kotliar (1984: 20) legitimises the job placement system with reference to the solidary 
alliance between labour force (i.e. citizens) and owners of means of production (i.e. state) with the 
necessary pathos: 'The functioning of socialist production presupposes the planned assignment of the 
able-bodied members of society to various types of activity and the coupling of labour power to the 
means of production on the basis of the comradely cooperation and reciprocal aid of associated owners 
of the means of production. Therein lies the economic content of the distribution of manpower within 
the system of socialist reproduction.' 
12
 Two other important institutions involved were the State Committees for Statistics (Goskomstat) and 
for Labour and Social Questions (Goskomtrud). 
13
 Services with similar tasks were abolished together with unemployment in the 1930s. 
14
 The status of JBPs in the literature is not consolidated. While Oxenstierna (1990: 97-98 and 114-116) 
prefers to take JPBs for a form of employment services outside organised allocation, Malle's (1987: 
358-360) assessment is more ambivalent; she tends to include them into forms of organised allocation 
because of their selective function. 
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In practice, they assisted first of all blue collar workers and offered mostly jobs with 
high turnover and in less popular regions and sectors.15 
These institutions applying to the mass of Soviet workers were complemented by the 
second system of executive job placement, which shall just be mentioned here. The 
alternative system of executive job placement was under the control of the Party 
organisations and partly followed secret regulations. Access to certain high as well as 
comparatively low rank positions on a special list ('nomenklatura') - an estimated 
number of four million jobs including managers or school directors - was limited to 
people approved by the Communist Party. Party members, on the other hand, had to 
accept assignments to work and were exchanged according to the Party rationale 
(Ioffe/Maggs 1983: 254-259). 
Limited scope 
Different (Western) authors agree that in the everyday practice of job changes and job 
search the overall relevance of state-controlled labour allocation should not be 
overestimated. Malle (1987) reviews available evidence of labour mobility in the 
Soviet Union and estimates the significance of the manifold institutions of job 
allocation in the later years of Soviet communism. Focusing on industrial labour she 
distinguishes mechanisms of organised and unplanned mobility into and out of jobs 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1 – Mechanisms of organised and unplanned labour mobility  
 
STRUCTURE OF TOTAL INDUSTRIAL MOBILITY 
 
Organised mobility 
 
Accession Separations 
- Placements of graduates of higher and 
specialized secondary education upon 
contract with the teaching institutions 
- Transfer to educational institutions 
on leave from production 
- Distribution of vocational school diploma 
students 
- Dismissal upon the terms of a 
temporary contract 
- Organized placement (Orgnabor) - Recruitment by the Army 
- Collective recruitment - Retirement, invalidity, death 
- Transfer from other enterprises - Curtailment of staff 
 - Transfer to other enterprises 
  
Unplanned mobility 
  
Hiring by the enterprise: Turnover: 
a) at the gate a) Voluntary quits 
b) through the Job Placement Bureaux b) Dismissal for disciplinary reasons 
Adapted from Malle (1987: 358; original emphasis) 
The quantification of the relevance of placement mechanisms shows that the 
significance of organised forms was altogether limited (see Table 2). Malle (ibid.) 
estimates that in 1981 two third of all job placements were actually 'hirings at the gate' 
and therefore beyond direct state control, while organised allocation accounted for the 
remaining maximum of about only one third in the same year. The quantitatively most 
                                                 
15
 Figures for their regionally different importance can be found in Malle (1987). For an assessment of 
the Soviet state employment service in a comparative perspective see Marnie (1992: chapter 4). 
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important institutions, the JPBs, contributed most to the increasing importance of job 
placement from the late 1960s to the early 1980s; however, in 1981 they processed 
not more than about 23% of all allocations. Orgnabor, finally, had little relevance; 
less than 6% of job placements were attributed to it in 1981. 
Table 2 – Relevance of mechanisms of job placement 
 
JOB PLACEMENT BY SOURCES (IN % OF THE TOTAL) IN THE USSR (1967-1981) 
 
Sources 1967 1971 1976 1981 
Hiring at the gate 87,7 79,2 67,4 62,2 
Placed by JPBs - 8,7 17,2 22,5 
Placed by Orgnabor 2,2 3,8 5,3 5,6 
Transfer from other enterprises 3,9 3,2 3,1 3,3 
Other channels of allocation 6,2 5,1 7,0 6,4 
Total organized allocation including placement by JPBs 12,3 20,8 32,6 37,8 
Total organized allocation excluding placement by JPBs 12,3 12,1 15,4 15,3 
Adapted from Malle (1987: 358; original emphasis) 
Discussing evidence of regional and sectoral differences in labour turnover, changes 
in policies, the impact of technological change, and the relative status of the various 
segments of the labour force, Malle's (ibid.) final assessment of Soviet (industrial) 
labour turnover points to directional changes within the structure of labour flows 
initiated during the 1970s. Most importantly, unforeseen factors of labour planning 
remained important from the mid 1970s onwards and 'reveal the inability of central 
planning to control employment flows' (381). At the same time, compulsory forms of 
labour planning, especially job placement bureaux, gained in importance from the late 
1970s onwards, as did the implementation of first job assignments of graduates. 
Young people have been a particularly important target group already of early forms 
of labour planning. Institutionally mediated by the Komsomol, youth was a central 
resource in the context of the 'physical construction of communism' already in the 
frame of the first five-year plan (Pilkington 1994: 56-60); in order to meet labour 
demands of the economy within a short period, young people were channelled through 
short training measures to become semi-skilled workers for jobs in 'mass trades'. For 
instance, Barber (1986: 57; also Blumenthal/Benson 1978: 37-38) describes the mass 
mobilisation of young male teenagers into vocational training in the year 1940 and the 
associated development of training infra-structure as 'major innovation in recruitment 
policy'.16 Another form of utilisation of young people as ad hoc labour force 
associated with Komsomol is reported by Lane (1987: 49): especially from the mid 
1950s to the mid 1960s the Communist Union of Youth was involved in organising 
young people's participation in employment mainly in construction projects and in 
enterprises in the northern and eastern areas of the country. First of all, 18 to 25 year-
old school or college graduates enrolled for some years following a recruitment 
device known as 'social appeals'.17 Furthermore, a record of Komsomol work usually 
positively affected access to better jobs and might well have resulted in entering the 
alternative route of job allocation towards, for instance, a party career. 
                                                 
16
 See Matthews (1982: 67-79) for the early development of vocational schools out of the need to 
mobilise the 'state labour reserve'; in Nozhko et al. (1968: 44-45) even referred to as 'labour reserve 
schools'. Some attention to gender differences in earlier labour resource policy is given by Kahan 
(1960). 
17
 Other forms of youth labour organised by the Komsomol included construction work during the 
summer (Moskoff 1984: chapter 2). 
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Another important institution relevant for the transition experiences of young males 
was the Soviet Army with its compulsory service of two years beginning at age 18. 
Deferments were granted only on special grounds (family, hardship, health) but 
generally to full-time students of higher education. For all the other young men 
military service implied a potential interruption of vocational training, and there were 
complaints that they did not return to professions they had acquired before the 
military service but instead changed to their qualification acquired during service 
(Granick 1987: 218). Though severely sanctioned, draft evasion was possible and 
common; failing to register, bribery, preferring jail to the army or simply disappearing 
was among the common ways of avoiding the service.18 
The significance of informal aspects of job mobility is substantiated by a survey 
among (mostly Jewish) Soviet immigrants living in the United states about their 
unemployment experiences in the USSR – the so-called 'Soviet Interview Project' 
conducted in 1983 (Gregory/Kohlhase 1988; Gregory/Collier 1988). It allows a 
comparative evaluation of actual job search methods of young and old ('mature') 
workers in the Soviet Union (see Table 3).  
Table 3 – Job search methods used by young and mature workers of the Soviet 
Interview Project (SIP) (%) 
 
young 
workers 
mature 
workers 
Age 19-24 34-54 
 % % 
Respondent inquired at enterprise/institution 11 15 
Told about vacancy by friend/relative/teacher 52 63 
Public announcement or advertised at school 10 14 
Official placement 26 7 
Other 1 1 
Total 100 100 
Adapted from Gregory/Collier (1988: 622; Table 5); Note: 'Official placement' includes the responses 'did 
practicum/special training there', 'komsomol placement', 'was invited/recruited', and 'military commission'.  
The survey underlines, on the one hand, the importance of 'non-institutional', informal 
ways of searching for jobs among both young and old workers. On the other hand, it 
emphasises the relatively higher significance of forms of official placement among 
youth. Obviously the two institutions of the army and the Komsomol, both targeted 
towards young people, contribute significantly to this difference. Altogether official 
placement is relevant for 26% of young workers compared to only 7% among older 
workers. 11% of the young workers 'inquired at enterprise/institution', 10% reacted to 
a public announcement or and advertisement at school, but the majority of 52% of 
young workers were told about the vacancy by friends, relatives or teachers. Among 
older workers this share amounts to 63%. 
Even if such a survey of former Soviet citizens might, for many reasons, suffer from a 
significant bias, the results seem plausible against the background of the above 
findings and indicate that there was both considerable space and need for labour 
mobility outside the institutional frame of reference also among young people. 
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 I cannot go into detail here but the equally unpopular military service would be another opportunity 
to discuss forms of 'underliving' Soviet institutions. For more detailed accounts see Solnick (1998: 
chapter 6) and Gross (1990). For a discussion of the role of organisations like the Read Army in the 
political socialisation of young adults on the basis of a fascinating 'clandestine sociological study' see 
Zaslavsky (1982: chapter 2). 
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Additional forms of youth job placement, that were more directly linked to the 
education system but partly overlapping with those already introduced, are discussed 
in the following part. 
Soviet Education for labour 
'The institutionalisation of individual lives in the Soviet Union began with the 
educational structure', maintain Titma/Saar (1995: 38) in their ex-post assessment of 
regional differences of Soviet secondary education.19 With its ideological claim to 
create equality and to be indifferent to the social origins of students, the Soviet 
educational system appears uniform only at its surface. Apart from having gone 
through several reforms it has always been subject to power struggles between 
different ministries and the Communist Party. Besides, there were regional differences 
in emphasis in the implementation of the Soviet model of education especially with 
regard to the upper grades of secondary education (see Titma 1993; Titma/Saar 1995).  
Yet, the degree of systematisation and control of the Soviet system of education was 
unequalled in the West. The link between education and work was more immediate, 
or, to put it differently, one main goal of education in a centrally planned economy 
was the availability of an educated 'general' labour force beside a pool of highly 
trained specialists. But educational credits did not necessarily translate into predefined 
transition patterns or chances. 'Educational policy has always been conceived in the 
light of social and political requirements, to which all other considerations must be 
subordinate', Grant (1970: 23) writes about the factual 'secondary importance' of 
purely educational purposes and effects within the Soviet ideology. Due to the 
ideology's obsession with control the education system was embedded within the 
primary concern about labour force planning (Lauglo 1988; Kaser 1986; Sowtis 
1991).  
Work was guaranteed at the end of the transition, not the kind of work; and 
organisational insufficiencies facilitated the non-arrival at suitable jobs. Therefore, 
beside general and vocational education students needed to be prepared for jobs they 
might not like. 'Vocational guidance' and other forms of labour socialisation have 
been important, if not the only tools that Soviet authorities would consider publicly in 
order to counteract the persistent dissatisfaction of graduates with job assignments. I 
start the following brief review of Soviet education with this important aspect of 
'education for labour', as Zajda (1979) terms it. In a second step I briefly introduce the 
structure of the Soviet education system; here, I need to restrict myself to the three 
main tracks of secondary education, i.e. general, vocational, and specialised. Finally, 
the main destinations of students after compulsory and after upper secondary 
education are discussed.20  
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 To be precise, early forms of 'institutionalisation' (now in the sense of 'being in institutions') were 
available before compulsory education and were strongly motivated by the work ideology. In order to 
'free working mothers' pre-school institutions like nurseries and kindergartens with boarding facilities 
were established. Already there, work-activities for children were an integral element (O'Dell 1983: 
110-112). As soon as children started to attend schools, many of them participated in extend day 
programmes, or they were supervised till the end of the working day. Leisure activities and other forms 
of out-of–school education also in summer (e.g. in clubs, 'hobby schools', camps), were mostly 
organised by Young pioneers, the communist youth organisation for children from 9 to 14 years 
(Blumenthal/Benson 1978: 26-30; O'Dell 1983: 117-120). 
20
 The issue of education and social mobility in the USSR would go beyond the scope of this paper and 
is not covered here. But it is evident from research that the Soviet education system did produce and 
The Missing Link 
11 
Education for labour – guidance, aspirations, and destinations 
A moment of creativity and individual freedom within the 'polytechnical vision' of 
integrating education and productive work rooted in Marx's criticism of alienation 
was central to early post-revolutionary educational philosophy. But already before 
1920 first steps towards an instrumentalisation of education for ideological 
indoctrination were made. Activities labelled 'socially useful labour' were considered 
crucial for the socialisation of young communists, and vocational training was 
introduced to the curriculum. It was during the first five-year plan (from 1928) that 
education was more explicitly geared towards the production of technical specialists 
in order to meet the demands of the economy. Economic planning became 'the 
backbone of educational policy' (Blumenthal/Benson 1978: 17).21 The emancipatory 
dimension of learning to work was abandoned and elements of centralist control were 
strengthened both on the level of state administration as well as within schools. In his 
review of early Soviet education policy Lauglo (1988) identifies a 'pattern of austere 
utilitarianism in education stressing social discipline and utility for the world of work' 
(ibid: 296; original emphasis); this trend would be liberalised in the USSR only during 
the reforms of the 1980s. 
'The Soviet Union is one of the few countries in the world where education is geared 
to the needs of the state rather than to the wishes of the individual. The entire 
educational system could be envisaged as a vast network of manpower training and, 
more specifically, labour socialisation', Zajda (1979: 288) writes about the education 
for labour in the USSR. The gap between the human resource demands of the Soviet 
economy, the 'socially available work' and the local needs, on the one hand, and the 
career aspirations of young people (last but not least facilitated by the 
'democratisation' of general education), on the other hand, made it necessary to ensure 
that young people would not leave education after one decade without having been 
equipped with the 'correct' (i.e. communist) attitude to labour. Marxism-Leninism 
provided a useful philosophy for the re-valuation of all sorts of work activities 
according to the slogan 'all jobs are equal'. This should facilitate the necessary 
'cooling out' of the previously raised ambitions of youths.22 Furthermore, compulsory 
polytechnical preparation of secondary school pupils by integrating of practical 
elements at all levels of schooling, which did meet the resistance of school authorities, 
should guarantee that early school leavers could be employed as workers. O'Dell/Lane 
(1976).  
Education of character, rather than skills development, was the main aspect of the 
'preparation of students for socially useful work', which, in official terms, used to be 
'one of the most important goals of contemporary Soviet schools' (Panachin 1982: 
451) as well as integral element of political socialisation towards Soviet patriotism. 
                                                                                                                                            
reproduce social inequalities along this three track system. See for instance Poignant (1969); Dobson 
(1977); Yanowitch (1977, 1981, 1986); Zajda (1980); Dobson/Swafford (1980); Meier (1989); Connor 
(1991); Gerber/Hout (1995); Titma/Saar (1995); Saar (1997); Ganzeboom/Nieuwbeerta (1999). For a 
rare, empirically substantiated comparison of variations in educational opportunities in different 
socialist countries see Peschar/Popping (1991). 
21
 The process of planning education is not reviewed here as it was largely a technical exercise. For a 
detailed description see Nozhko et al. (1968). 
22
 O'Dell/Lane (1976: 424) illustrate the custom of somewhat inflated praises of manual labour with 
quoting the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol: 'School-children have at times a 
most confused impression of many jobs and have not understood the significance of such indispensable 
and important specialisms as those of the turner, the milling-machine operator, the metalworker, and 
the polisher etc.'' 
Herwig Reiter 
12 
The 'correct' attitude had to recognise work of any kind as a form of fulfilment and 
expression of one's love for the country. Needless to say, not all Soviet citizens shared 
this enthusiasm and the antagonism between individual and societal interests was a 
persistent problematic feature of youth job placement (see below). In order to bring 
children's interests closer to locally needed and available jobs, professional 
orientation, so-called 'vocational guidance' was introduced at school and 
institutionalised in the late 1960s (Matthews 1982: 60). First of all in the sense of 
'corrective education' it should re-adjust ambitions and 'compensate for shortcomings 
of the family in terms of labour socialisation' (Zajda 1979: 290). Work training, which 
was also used to reform problematic pupils, was integrated at all levels of education, 
but could take different forms in urban and rural areas.  
The educational reform of the 1980s again stressed the vocational moment in general 
education – this time vocational qualification rather than orientation - by, for instance 
adding compulsory labour practice during the summer holidays to the educational 
programme. Additionally, many other forms of moral education and 'voluntary' work 
throughout the year (as well as paid work in summer) were organised by the 
Komsomol. Depending on the grade, it consisted of 10 to 20 days (of three to six 
hours) of work activity for the community. While the aim continued to be the 
development of the 'right' attitude to work, a certain 'love of labour' (Tudge 1991: 
131), the activity itself was of minor importance. Work with the label 'socially useful' 
could be very heterogeneous and was not necessarily 'productive' in any way. 
Depending on the age of the child it could, for instance, include simple activities like 
'learning to dress and care for oneself and to do household chores and take care of 
school rooms as well as mastering the rudiments of manual labor with tools' (Szekely 
1986: 339).23  
Despite all attempts to manipulate young people's attitudes towards work, their 
aspirations and choices remained, as numerous studies show (e.g. Shlapentokh 1989: 
71-79), relatively uninfluenced and continued to be targeted towards higher education. 
Their actual work experiences, on the other hand, were a major source contributing to 
youth dissatisfaction with Soviet society (Riordan 1986). 
Three main tracks of Soviet upper secondary education 
The structure of the Soviet educational system has changed over the years according 
to the emphasis of different regimes; reforms were often accompanied by lively 
processes of interest negotiation involving also various 'publics' like media, parents' 
groups or the silent resistance of factory managers (e.g. Schwartz/Keech 1968). One 
of the longer periods of stability lasted for about two decades from the mid 1960s to 
the mid 1980s. In my brief review of the three main tracks after lower secondary 
education I refer mainly to this period as it is best documented. Besides, the 
succeeding reforms of 1984 and 1988, which introduced, for instance, a programme of 
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 Anisimov (1972) illustrates what 'work education' in the context of polytechnical education finally 
was about; and what the differences were at educational levels and with regard to urban and rural 
contexts. Some of the skills that should be acquired were: Using the most important tools, being able to 
'read a drawing, or make a sketch', to operate the 'most common machine tools', starting up 'an internal 
combustion engine, an electric motor, a pump, compressor', to carry out the 'main types of electrical 
assembly repair work' (8). Programmes for rural schools paid more attention to the 'most general 
principles of basic agricultural techniques and production'. This included, for instance, work on 
'experimental plots of land attached to the schools', where agricultural products were grown and basic 
skills of husbandry acquired. During summer students had to work in 'pupils production brigades'. At 
higher educational levels students were 'trained to work on tractors, combines and other agricultural 
machines'; and they were introduced to the 'basics of agrotechnic and animal husbandry' (10). 
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11 years of compulsory education by adding one year at the bottom of the educational 
ladder,24 maintained the crucial trifurcation at the age of about 15 years; however, 
they have never been fully implemented.25  
Typically, after eight years of comprehensive primary and lower secondary education, 
young people entered one of the three different tracks of upper secondary education – 
further general secondary education, vocational secondary education or specialised 
secondary education (see Figure 1). These tracks were associated with clearly defined 
future roles of its graduates and decisions taken at this crucial selection point of the 
system were largely irreversible. In fact, this usually delicate moment of educational 
choice among students and parents suffered from additional uncertainty and potential 
injustice due to arbitrariness in the placement of students into one of the tracks.26 The 
option of entering enter work immediately after finishing eight years of education (the 
'fourth track') had virtually disappeared as further education was encouraged and 
compulsory upper secondary education introduced in the 1980s (see Table 4 below). 
Figure 1 – Transitions in the Soviet educational system, 198027 
Grade Age
Higher 
education
Tech. school (TU) 16%
11+ 27%
12 Specialised 
11 sec. school Vocational school
10 SSUZ (S)PTU
9 6% 33%
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Years Age
lower (incomplete) secondary 
Spec. sec. school (SSUZ)
16%
General secondary school
60%
6/7
15
Primary and 
education
 
Numbers for 1980 taken from Marnie (1986: 212); see below Tables 4 and 5 
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 In the year 1958 a compulsory education of 8 years was established. From 1979 it was extended to 
10 years and finally to 11 years from 1984. Compulsory education was not standardised across all 
Soviet Republics; for instance, in the Baltic republics it used to be one year longer and was 
correspondingly extended to 12 years in the mid 1980s. 
25
 A comprehensive overview of the Soviet educational system would go beyond the scope of this 
paper. The monographs referred to are Grant (1970) and Matthews (1982). For an assessment of the 
educational reform adopted in 1984 see Szekely (1986), Kaser (1986), Kuebart (1987), Kerr (1988), 
and Sowtis (1991). 
26
 Titma/Saar (1995: 40) comment the allocation of students in the 1980s: 'In the last years of the Soviet 
Union conflicts of interest between the three main types of secondary schools were strong and led to 
very subjective methods of allocating students to different schools after the 8th grade. (School 
vocational counsellors could allocate students on particularistic grounds because there were no 
common exams or guidelines.)' 
27
 This is a simplified representation of the Soviet educational system for the purpose of illustrating the 
three main tracks. Special schools and institutions of adult or evening education are not included; also 
part time schooling in prolonged courses was possible. For a comparison of the educational structure at 
four different moments in history as well as a discussion of the reforms after World War II see Jakir 
(2003). 
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The majority of young people finished their secondary education in the upper level of 
general secondary schools (full name: secondary general educational labour 
polytechnical schools). They were the main entrance points to the academic track and 
prepared, in theory, mainly for higher education and university. The (political) 
problem was that, along the way, many students dropped out of this most popular 
form of education or completed it and went to work without acquiring utilisable 
qualifications. Repeated attempts to incorporate elements of vocational training into 
the curricula of general education contributed little to the mismatch of labour supply 
and actual labour demand. According to the Soviet population census in 1979 the 
share of persons in the work force with 'secondary (general or specialised) and higher 
education' increased from 17% in the year 1959 to 54% in 1979 (Chizhova 1984). 
About one out of six graduates from upper secondary education continued the 
academic track; 95% of the entrants to one of the institutions of higher education - 
commonly referred to as (VUZ - vysshee uchebnoe zavedenia) - were graduates from 
general secondary education. Higher education included, apart from universities, 
numerous institutions and colleges, all of which were involved in research and 
awarded diploma (Matthews 1982: chapter 4; Grant 1970: chapter 5). 
Vocational or technical schools recruited less gifted students or dropouts from other 
tracks and prepared manual workers and future peasants; for them, continuation in 
higher education was effectively impossible. In the beginning of the 1960s the former 
state labour reserve schools, which, after the war, used to recruit masses of students 
mostly involuntarily into ordinary training, were turned into vocational and technical 
schools (PTU - professionalno-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche) (Matthews 1982: chapter 
3). PTUs lasted for 1 to 3 years and provided training for workers in manual skills; 
upper secondary education had to be completed at evening schools. These schools had 
the worst reputation and were considered 'schools for the "failed"' (Marnie 1986: 
211).28 Alternatively, secondary vocational-technical schools (SPTU - srednee 
professionalno-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche), which were introduced at the end of the 
1960s, lasted for 3 to 4 years and provided a combination of training in a production 
skill with general education. Due to the additionally offered general education they 
transcended the dead-end character of regular vocational schools, and became 
increasingly popular in the 1970s. SPTUs qualified for higher education and had the 
status of an alternative to general upper secondary education; nevertheless, most of 
the graduates from these schools started to work. A variation of the SPTU existed for 
graduates from upper secondary education that were not admitted to higher or 
secondary-specialised education. They could attend a technical school (TU - 
tekhnicheskoe uchilishche) for 1 to 2 years before they entered work. 
Institutions of specialised secondary education including technical schools (SSUZ - 
srednee spetsialnoe uchebnoe zavedenie, or tekhnikum)29 trained semi-professionals 
for non-manual jobs like technicians, nurses, primary school teachers, librarians etc. 
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 Dunstan (1987: 58-60) illustrates the problematic setting as well as 'clientele' of vocational schools 
and concludes that this was ultimately reinforced by 'teachers who divide 11-year-olds into the 
excellent, the good and the "PTU candidates", treating them accordingly' (ibid: 58). For the bad image 
of PTUs as reflected in young people's letters to the editor see Eggeling (1999: 136-138). Altogether, 
he low status of vocational schools seems to reflect a constant in human value systems across 
ideological contexts; despite the strong emphasis on manual work within the Soviet ideology, the 
devaluation-spell on skilled and wage labour, deeply rooted in history (Conze 1972: 155), could never 
be broken. 
29
 This acronym (SSUZ) is not found in Soviet sources but was introduced by Matthews (1982) in order 
to indicate Soviet secondary special educational institutions including technical schools (tekhnikumy).  
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for a period of 2 to 4 years. Early school-leavers were admitted to courses of up to 4 
years; shorter courses of 2 years were designed for graduates from general upper 
secondary education, which were not admitted to higher education. This track was 
strictly committed to the outcome of skilled professionals; in principle, the passage to 
higher education (usually after a few years of work) was possible but highly 
restricted. Like the low-grade vocational schools also specialised secondary schools 
generally suffered from poor reputation, although some institutions were highly 
prestigious (Matthews 1982: chapter 3). Another feature they had in common with 
vocational schools was the insufficient preparation of the students for the work they 
would have to perform in their specialisation. A large part of what would be called 
'vocational training' outside school in a Western context took the form of training on-
the-job within enterprises (Matthews 1982: 178-182; Kahan 1960). 
Main destinations of graduates 
In the 1980s about 4 million young people per year finished basic education and 
moved into one of the three main tracks of further education. About 2 million young 
people graduated from 10 or 11 years of secondary education. Tables 4 and 5 show 
the transition patterns of school leavers at these two thresholds.30 
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 Statistics about flows through the system have not been published and the available data have several 
shortcomings. Transfers between tracks cannot be estimated and drop out rates need to be painstakingly 
reconstructed; for the latter see Matthews (1982). Furthermore, as Dunstan (1987: 49) mentions, it 
remains unclear how many students left the upper secondary level because of having received their 
internal passport at 16 that allowed them to get a job. 
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Table 4 - Destinations of school children after the 8th grade, 1965-1980 (%) 
  1965 1975 1980 
9th grade 40,0 60,9 60,2 
SPTU  10,2 19,3 
PTU 12,3 21,4 13,8 
SSUZ 5,2 5,2 6,2 
Work 42,5 2,3 0,5 
 100 100 100 
Table 5 - Destinations of school children after the 10th/11th grade, 1965-1980 (%) 
 1965 1975 1980 
Work 16,2 55,3 41,2 
TU  12,9 26,9 
VUZ 41,4 15,8 16,3 
SSUZ 42,4 16,0 15,6 
 100 100 100 
both: adapted from Marnie (1986: 212, tables 12.1a and 12.1b) 
At the first threshold after lower secondary education the emphasis shifted from work 
towards education and training. While more than 40% of young people started to 
work after basic education in the year 1965, this share was negligible by 1980. At that 
time, 60% of the students continued in the first track of general upper secondary 
education, 33% entered the vocational track (PTU and SPTU) and some 6% into the 
specialised secondary track (SSUZ). Within the vocational track the SPTUs 
additionally providing general education overtook the PTUs in popularity and became 
the second most important option for completing education. The share of graduates 
staying for specialised secondary education more or less remained on the same level 
over the years. 
The majority, about 40%, of young people leaving secondary education at the second 
threshold after 10 or 11 years entered straight to work largely without additional 
vocational training; in 1975 this share even amounted to 55%. This group also 
included graduates from general education that had failed to continue with higher 
education and were therefore least interested in the mainly blue-collar job 
opportunities waiting for them.31 One out of four continued within the vocational 
track (PU), and about one out of six in specialised secondary (SSUZ) or higher 
education (VUZ) respectively. The proportions had changed dramatically since the 
1960s, when specialised and higher educational tracks still were the two main routes 
for those who completed upper secondary education. The tertiary sector did not keep 
up with the expansion of general education and access to higher education became 
more and more competitive. Only a rather small proportion of young people in the 
academic track via upper secondary education actually entered higher education; and, 
considering an estimated dropout rate of one out of seven in the late 1970s (Matthews 
1982: 104; 167-168), only a few of those who entered the academic track after lower 
secondary education actually managed to complete it.32 
                                                 
31
 This unresolved problem has been at the centre of the reform of vocational training in the 1980s 
(Kuebart 1987). 
32
 Dropouts were an important but largely undocumented problem at all levels and in all tracks. For 
instance Titma (1993: 161) writes about dropouts from lower secondary education: 'In practice, 
dropouts before eigth grade were quite numerous but went unnoticed because local authorities in 
charge of education were not at all interested in counting them, fearing punishment for poor work. 
Even in Estonia, local authorities produced statistics that were total nonsense, indicating that 103 
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The age of entering the world of work increased due to the trend towards further or 
higher education and/or training and was, during the 1980s, 18 years or more. 
Correspondingly, the labour force participation of young people below the age of 20 
years decreased over the decades from 40% in 1970 down to 30% at the end of the 
1980s (see Table 6). The activity rate still used to be about 40% in the year 1970 and 
dropped to about 30% by the end of the 1980s. 
Table 6 – Activity rates of the youth population in the USSR, 1959 to 198933 
age 1959 1970 1979 1989 
15~19 73,0 39,6 36,2 29,0 
20~24   85,7 78,9 
25~29   95,4 92,2 
20~29 83,0 88,0 90,3 86,1 
     
Source: ILO (Internet, 07.02.05 and 07.04.2005), own calculations; Oxenstierna (1990: 202, table 7.7) 
Soviet secondary education was regionally differentiated and so were transitions into 
one of the three tracks of upper secondary education. Titma/Saar (1995)34 trace young 
people's transitions to upper secondary education in the 1980s across different regions 
of the USSR and provide a differentiated picture of the degree of variation within the 
Soviet educational system despite its universalistic claims. First of all, the structure of 
educational institutions followed the logic of what might be called national path-
dependencies. Opportunities for young people were regionally unequal because of 
differences in emphasis on these three tracks and the actual availability of certain 
school types. The more expensive schools offering vocational training were rather 
established in industrial areas. In Lithuania, for instance, about half of young people 
in upper secondary education attended general secondary schools, 20% technical 
schools and 30% vocational schools. The two other Baltic republics had higher 
proportions of students in general and less in vocational education (ibid.: 44, Figure 
2). In those regions, where insufficient resources did not allow for the fulfilment of 
ideological directives concerning successful delivery of schooling, they were followed 
only formally. It was common that certificates were faked and numbers of graduates 
manipulated. While the selection process into vocational schools was guided by 
similar rules across regions, the patterns of recruitment of students to the other two 
more advanced tracks was associated with the regional social differences in a 
reinforcing way. The ideologically idealised working class recruited its members 
through a process of negative selection inherent in the educational system that was 
often executed by powerful individuals in key-positions (i.e. especially teachers) or by 
mediating institutions like the Komsomol. 
Young people's aspirations and vocational choices have been popular topics of 
sociological studies in the Soviet Union, which tried to 'discover a correlation (if any) 
between the "pyramid of desires" (student's vocational aspirations) and the "pyramid 
of demand" (manpower needs)', as Zajda (1980: 6) puts it. Little surprisingly, these 
studies confirmed the low prestige of manual work irrespective of (material) 
incentives attached or counteracting indoctrination in form of vocational guidance 
(e.g. Shlapentokh 1989: chapter 2). Contrary to the societal need for trained workers, 
                                                                                                                                            
percent of their students graduated from the eighth grade. The actual number of dropouts in different 
regions is a real puzzle and can only be roughly estimated.' 
33
 The ILO 'activity rate' refers to the sum of employed and unemployed persons as a percentage of the 
total population. 
34
 For earlier, more descriptive information on regional differences see Titma (1993). 
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young people continued aspiring to higher education, which pointed to the unresolved 
systemic problem of the asynchronous evolution of the three structural dimensions of 
career-choice attitudes, the educational system and the system of production as well as 
their different responsiveness to administrative control (Shubkin 1985; Schubkin 
1991).35 Politically uncomfortable research results like these were suppressed, as 
Solnick (1998: 150-152) reports from an interview with a leading sociologist; and, 
usually without entering controversy, researchers contended themselves with 
suggesting ever more sophisticated ways of manipulating student's preferences.36 
Evidence for the mismatch between aspirations and actual assignments is rare and 
surveys are often not representative. However, some estimation is possible and can 
illustrate the issue. Marnie (1986: 216-219), for instance, indicates that in the year 
1975 46% of tenth-class leavers intended to continue with higher education but only 
16% actually made it. The group of school-leavers from general education going 
directly to work consisted mostly of those who had failed to pass the highly 
competitive entrance exams for higher education.37 Instead of the anticipated 
continuation towards an intellectual career, they were expected by mainly unskilled 
jobs in industry and agriculture. The relatively low level of barriers to upward social 
mobility in terms of young people's education compared to their parents, which 
Peschar/Popping (1991) find for one city in the USSR, might have only contributed to 
the frustration about the low quality of available jobs. Another large group among 
early job entrants facing similar disappointments consisted of graduates from rural 
schools directly entering into unqualified agricultural work. There is indication that 
being a young woman further aggravated disadvantage.38 
Youth job placement - mechanisms and shortcomings 
Form the early 1930s onwards the Soviet authorities had the legal possibility to place 
graduates for a certain time at their first job. Systematic recruitment of young people, 
mostly from rural areas, directly into labour, low-quality training, or the first job had 
become coercive during the 1940s in the context of the introduction of the country-
                                                 
35
 There is good reason to assume that 'Shubkin' and 'Schubkin' refers to the same person. 
36
 The internal quarrel about the, as it appears, extraordinarily 'hot topic' of aspirations of young people 
among Soviet sociologists with a more or less strong bias towards the regime becomes evident from a 
statement by Michael Rutkevitch, former president of the Soviet Sociological Association and director 
of the Institute of Sociological Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In a reply to a brief and 
comment on Soviet sociology criticising its openly political orientation (Kolaja 1978), Rutkevitch 
(1978) insits on the misrepresentation of pupils' aspirations by the author. He then underlines his firm 
conviction of the benefits of a 'union of policy and sociology' for the sake of the 'control of society' 
(ibid.). For a review of the apologetic character status of sociology in the Soviet Union, implicitly 
including sociological youth research, and the apparent co-evolution of some careers in both science 
and party see e.g. Shalin (1978, 1990), Beliaev/Burtorin (1982), Greenfeld (1988), and Weinberg 
(1992).  
37
 Matthews (1982: 131), for example, presents figures from Leningrad University going up to 12 
applications per place in 1974. 
38
 The relatively greater disadvantage of young women in this respect can be noted here only as a 
suspicion arising from remarks made by Riordan (1986: 151-152). He quotes Soviet sources being 
concerned about the 'feminisation' of certain unpopular jobs and mentions that in the course of the 
depopulation of rural areas it is mostly women who stay behind to do farm work. Also Kahan 
(1960:78-79) mentions the disadvantage of women with regard to the recruitment into vocational 
training as well as wages. Blumenthal/Benson (1978: 91) report figures concerning the composition of 
students accepted into vocational schools; in 1970 the relationship between girls and boys was 
approximately 1 to 3. 
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wide system of 'State Labour Reserves'. For some two decades 'many hundreds of 
thousands of trainees were conscripted against their will' into poor training and 
inefficient placement procedures as Matthews (1982: 67-79) maintains. Yet, due to 
labour protection young people, minors especially, were among those social groups, 
which were difficult to integrate into the labour force (together with women with 
young children, older workers, and the disabled). State intervention was common in 
order to fulfil the socialist promise of full employment and enterprises were required 
to reserve a certain quota for the employment of minors graduating from general 
secondary education. In the mid 1960s the problem of matching became acute. Due to 
the graduation of post-war baby boomers and the shortening of education by one year, 
two large cohorts of school leavers had to be placed at once. Despite the political 
commitment to economic reform granting some autonomy to the management of 
labour force in enterprises, the maximum youth quota was doubled and school leavers 
were channelled into local enterprises pressured to meet the established quota (Cook 
1993: 54-58). Youth placement commissions, already established earlier were 
revaluated on a national level and became attached to local soviets. Additionally, the 
above-mentioned system of 'vocational guidance' was set up first of all in order to 
steer the development of children's interests towards local needs and available jobs. 
All these institutions remained important as such but were subsidiary to the overall 
plan. Placement of graduates differed by educational level but usually followed the 
same logic including the essential elements of planning, fulfilling targets and meeting 
certain obligations involved on both sides of the (prospective) labour contract. The 
most important institutions in the background were the Youth Placement 
Commissions attached to local soviets. They operated on the basis of annual plan 
assignments and were made up of representatives from the local labour section, the 
schools, the Party, the Komsomol, the Trade Unions, local enterprises and local 
Soviet delegates. The local labour section, a local 'outlet' of the Goskomtrud system, 
prepared preliminary recommendations to the Commission based on their information 
about available jobs and graduates. Enterprises were expected to reserve a certain 
proportion of jobs for school leavers (between 0,5% and 10% of their staff). The 
Commission then handed a document including a job guarantee over to the school 
leavers, who could accept the assigned job. In fact, many found jobs without making 
use of the official placement procedure (Helgeson 1984: 58-59). 
The theory of controlled matching together with its institutional framework did not 
survive the practice test. The job placement system met resistance among graduates as 
well as enterprises, and the ideal of assignments according to qualifications could not 
be realised. The apparently increasing number of graduates actually working in 
assigned workplaces in the beginning of the 1980s (Malle 1987: 359) cannot obscure 
the fact that the matching between graduates and labour requirements was 
insufficient. Young people were reluctant to follow assignments and inventive in 
circumventing them; many left their jobs prematurely. Enterprises, on the other hand, 
sometimes refused to take graduates; they failed to meet the standards of the provision 
of living conditions, or simply changed their 'plans' and quota in the meantime. 
Searching for a workplace was common among graduates and different (mostly 
Western) scholars calculated an average period of searching for the first job (referred 
to as 'unemployment') of three to six months (Oxenstierna 1990: 226-227). 
Gregory/Collier (1988) even claim an estimated average unemployment rate of 3,5% 
among Soviet young people between 18 and 24 years. Adirim (1989: Table 1) 
calculates an estimated 830.000 young people in temporary unemployment for 1985. 
And Porket (1989: 106-110) emphasises regional differences in youth unemployment.  
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Altogether the placement of graduates in the USSR was quantitatively relevant; for 
instance, youth job placement and allocations from secondary and higher education 
(PTU, SSUZ, and VUZ) together accounted for 17% of all forms of workforce 
recruitment in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the year 1980 (Kotliar 1984: 25). 
Also with regard to forced local mobility, young people and young adults were the 
most relevant group affected by migration programmes giving priority to eastern 
regions (Helgeson 1986). The link between educational institutions and enterprises 
varied according to level of education. In the following I distinguish two turntables of 
regular transition qua placement – i.e. the the placement of graduates from vocational 
schools and the placement of graduates from higher and specialised education.39 
Placement of graduates from vocational education 
Compared to the assignment of young specialists discussed below, the placement of 
graduates from ordinary or secondary vocational-technical schools (PTUs, SPTUs) 
functioned rather smoothly. Yet, this advantage comes with a considerable degree of 
coercion, a feature that has been part of the recruitment into vocational training ever 
since low-grade schools in the frame of the state labour reserve policy after the World 
War II (Matthews 1982: chapter 3). Furthermore, coercion contributed to the low 
popularity of these schools that were additionally burdened by low level of discipline 
(Matthews 1982: 88). Providing first of all locally demanded labour force, graduates 
were mostly sent to specific workplaces, so-called 'base enterprises', which were 
usually directly associated with the schools and already involved in training. 
Since 1980 the State Committee for Vocational Education was responsible for 
developing plan targets for the training and placement of graduates from vocational 
schools; and since 1982 newly established enterprises with more than 2000 employees 
had to be associated with vocational schools (Helgeson 1984: 59-60). Many Soviet 
towns were 'company towns', i.e. dominated by single enterprises with little 
alternatives for vocational training. In terms of sectoral attachment the schools were 
clearly oriented towards agriculture and industry. For example, during the eleventh 
Five-Year Plan from 1981 to 1985 36% of graduates went into agriculture, 31% into 
industry, 14% into construction and 6% into transport/communication (Oxenstierna 
1990: 222; Table 8.12).  
The above-indicated general problems of placement procedures applied also to this 
threshold. Enterprises are reported to have refused to accept PTU-graduates claiming 
they would not remain in the job long enough. This concern seemed justified. Less 
than half of the more than 2000 respondents of a survey among PTU trainees in the 
year 1975 intended to continue working in their acquired trade. Most of the others 
wanted to change their specialisation, study further or were undecided (Matthews 
1982: 88). This basic dissatisfaction in the early work career could be one 
'explanation' of much of the intentional job mobility that obviously occurred in the 
Soviet society.  
Furthermore companies criticised PTU-training for neglecting practical training in 
favour of general education that is of little use on the job (O'Dell 1983: 134). From 
the perspective of labour planning, on the other hand, the training within the PTU 
system, and not on-the-job, was considered an advantage, for already existing 
associations with companies could have undermined control (Helgeson 1984: 60). 
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 The treatment of specialised schools (SSUZ) together with institutions of higher education does not 
imply that their status was similar, only the administrative procedure (Matthews 1982: 89). 
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Despite the fact that most of the professional skills could actually be acquired only in 
the workplace and were not part of the schools' training programmes, authorities kept 
arguing against forms of on-the job training essentially criticising their narrow focus 
and the lacking possibility to exert influence (Matthews 1982: 178-182). Many of the 
shortcomings of professional preparation of students were finally recognised by the 
authorities and vocational qualification, rather than vocational orientation, was at the 
focus of the penultimate educational reform adopted in 1984 (Szekely 1986). 
Placement of graduates from secondary-specialised and higher education 
Each year graduates from higher and specialised secondary education, so-called 
'young specialists', were processed through the job allocation and assignment system 
for college graduates (raspredelenie – 'distribution'). On the basis of an assessment of 
the need for young specialists, Gosplan, the State Planning Committee, assigned 
quotas to each ministry supervising institutions of higher education.40 These 
ministries, in turn, elaborated assignment plans and passed them on to institutions of 
higher education. So-called Commissions for Personal Distribution, which operated 
on the level of educational institutions and consisted usually of representatives of the 
institution itself, the Komsomol, and trade unions, then had to match graduates and 
postings available. In theory, the commission had to guarantee jobs to all graduates 
corresponding to their training and speciality. On the basis of its assessment of the 
academic progress of the prospective graduates, their social activities, family 
circumstances and health situation the Commission established a list of assignments 
and invited the students for an interview. Graduates could articulate preferences or 
apply for being released from placement for health or family reasons, but usually had 
to accept the assignments. After the legally granted one month of holiday, graduates 
had to work in these jobs for at least three years; they were often required to move 
into distant areas. The underlying philosophy was that, in this way, graduates would 
repay the state for their education (Matthews 1982: 169-170). 
Also the placement of graduates from higher and sepcialised education suffered from 
obvious difficulties. While it was easier to establish the demand for specialised labour 
in certain areas like education, health and administration, it was more difficult in 
others like production. Unpredictable economic development or simply changeable 
political priorities constituted one cluster of difficulties. Another consisted in the 
general anticipation of employers of being affected by labour shortage, which often 
lead managers to over-estimating their need for specialists. Being released from 
posting by the Commissions due to shortcomings in planning did happen but was a 
rare privilege, and the competition for 'more desirable jobs (…) tended to become the 
focus of all kinds of unofficial pressures,' as Matthews (1982: 171) maintains. The 
real dimension of the gap became apparent only in the actual process of placement 
and the dissatisfaction of students was often doubled by the professional obligations, 
which they finally had to accept on top of the potentially undesired topic they had to 
study. Many specialists with or without higher education ended up doing manual 
work; some had actually been ill-required by enterprises instead of graduates from 
vocational schools. 
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 Helgeson (1984: 60) provides a lively picture of the obviously inscrutable planning exercise: 
'Gosplan comes up with a comprehensive match of jobs and graduating classes every year subdivided 
for over 1.000 specialities in all branches of the Soviet economy. The 1977 specialist distribution plan 
was 4.248 pages long. And this is only what is called the inter-ministerial and inter-republican section 
of the plan.' 
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Evidence allowing an estimation of the scope of the problem is hardly available. 
Oxenstierna (1990: 220-221), for instance, reports from a study conducted in the year 
1985 that 84% of graduates from specialised secondary schools and 17% of graduates 
from higher education following compulsory assignments ended up working in blue-
collar positions. Malle (1987: 378) notes that 'intellectual unemployment' was 
common among young specialists. Referring to a report from 1984 she indicates that 
about 12% of blue collar jobs in engineering were held by graduates from university; 
70% of engineers did not work in their specialisation and 22% worked in jobs not 
requiring higher education. This non-availability of appropriate jobs is identified by 
Solnick (1998: chapter 5) as one of two major problems that plagued the system of 
mandatory placement of university graduates ever since the 1950s until its abolition. 
The other problem consisted in the reluctance of graduates to assume their assigned 
job obligations. Both issues were hardly documented and obviously outside the reach 
of the authorities. Statistics available for the 1980s from Goskomstat and Komsomol 
(Table 14) suggest that some 10% of graduates from higher education did not follow 
their assignments; up to 20% of those who did, left before the completion of the first 
year of their three-year assignment. 
Table 14 – Job assignment non-compliance ('no-shows') and attrition (%) 
  1980 1982 1985 1987 
 data source     
No-shows of VUZ graduates       
 Goskomstat 8,9 - 9,4 8,0 
 Komsomol - 12 - 12 
Assignees no longer on job after nine months      
 Goskomstat 5,1 - 5,4 5,2 
 Komsomol - n.a. - 20 
Adapted from Solnick (1998: 148, table 5.3.) 
These quite diverging official statistics underestimate the problem and indicate the 
misinformation within the system. Enterprises that could have identified the scope of 
the problem had little interest neither in revealing their miscalculation of labour force 
needs, nor in holding assignees back for they saved the costs of unneeded labour. 
Likewise, those young specialists disappointed by their assignments preferred to 
disappear over filing a complaint, for this could have worsened their situation. It was 
due to this 'tacit collusion between unenthusiastic employer and unwilling employee', 
as Solnick (ibid: 136) notes, that much of the issue remained undiscovered, that 
informal ways of searching for (alternative) jobs remained important, and that the 
system feature of overproducing specialists never ceased to exist. 
Concluding remarks 
A closer look at the institutional arrangements of the transition of young people from 
education to labour in the Soviet Union provides an ambivalent picture. Despite the 
relatively stronger impact of planning in the area of transitions to the first job the 
system failed to establish the close links between education and labour for which it 
was, and still seems to be, famous. The right to work and the job guarantee expressed 
in Article 40 of the Soviet Constitution of 1977 was closely associated with the right 
to choose one's profession and type of work according to preferences and society's 
needs. 
Article 40. Citizens of the USSR have the right to work (that is, to guaranteed employment and pay in 
accordance with the quantity and quality of their work, and not below the state-established minimum), 
including the right to choose their trade or profession, type of job and work in accordance with their 
inclinations, abilities, training and education, with due account of the needs of society. 
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This right is ensured by the socialist economic system, steady growth of the productive forces, free 
vocational and professional training, improvement of skills, training in new trades or professions, and 
development of the systems of vocational guidance and job placement (Prokhorov 1982: 12). 
The review of the transition arrangements versus transitions realised allows a much 
better idea of the actual meaning of this constitutional promise and the interaction of 
its ingredients. All the emphasis put on vocational orientation and work, both 
ideologically and in terms of life organisation, the transitions of young people to 
work, as well as finally, the Soviet society as such, remained characterised by the 
basic contradiction between what its citizens had learned and what they worked. On 
the way to the world of work millions of (young) people experienced the immediate 
devaluation of years of their studies as well as the disregarding of their career 
aspirations. The freedom to make work-related choices, especially to choose one's 
first job, was strongly restricted. Where many arrived at the end of their school-to-
work transitions was in stark contrast to where they wanted (and perhaps even had 
planned) to get. The one outcome that could be predicted, though, was that they would 
have work but the ideologically praised world of (mostly manual) work was finally 
closer to the reality of the majority of Soviet citizens. The particular form of 
uncertainty incorporated into the transitions of Soviet youth to labour finally consisted 
in the fact that the guaranteed work activity at the end of education likely turned out 
to be unsatisfactory and unrelated to qualifications and aspirations.  
The primacy of administrative order and its bureaucratic rituals as well as the 
altogether widely unsuccessful attempt to appropriate and regulate the matching 
procedure actually thwarted both individual wishes and potential market matching. 
Job wishes possibly developed throughout an extensive period of education were cut 
off at an early age. This makes the notorious underutilisation of labour in the USSR 
appear as having been first of all an underutilisation of the (young) people's potential 
desire to do certain jobs and their striving for professionalism. The non-utilisation of 
specialist capacity and the low productivity of Soviet labour might have been 
secondary effects of unfulfilled striving on a biographical level. The universal 
orientation towards education, the wide access to it, its importance for upward social 
mobility, and the monetary as well as non-monetary benefits connected to the jobs for 
the well-educated indicate a 'more direct relation between education and prestige in 
the USSR' (Katz 1999: 429). It seems that the status outcome was more important 
than the qualification outcome. The quality of a job, on the other hand, was not 
assessed only by its 'goodness of fit' with regard to qualification or interest but also 
according to opportunities it offered for making money on the side (Porket 1989: 
chapter 8).  
Altogether this phenomenon of a decoupling of education and employment and the 
related inflation of education is common in Western (European) countries and burdens 
young people's transitions to working life (Reiter/Craig 2005). Roberts (2006) 
identifies the USA as the trendsetting nation in this respect and contemplates the 
phenomenon of 'global Americanisation'. In an analogy one could ask whether 
Western Europe is not actually 'going East' and reproducing patterns that have been 
common in socialism. Even more so, as much of the more recent increase in 
participation in further and higher education in Europe is actually clearly policy-
driven (i.e. 'Bologna process') - in the case of EU-Europe under the heading of making 
Europe 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world' 
(European Commission 2002: 9). Furthermore, the indicated US-American striving 
for mass higher education in the 1960s certainly was one of the spin-offs of the then 
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major competition for superior performance by the two protagonists of the Cold War, 
the USA and the USSR. Much of the 'space race' triggered by the success of the 
Soviet Sputnik in 1957 was carried out in US-American class rooms (Jahn 1975; also 
Kudrov 1997). With some delay this 'race' has become global. In any case, it seems 
fair to claim that the world is not catching up with the USA only.41 
These were more general conclusions. On the basis of the review it is now also 
possible to give a tentative reply to the initially outlined two-dimensional 
misconception of the Soviet case. First, a reply to the educational fallacy: The 
educational promise suggested by the trifurcate system of Soviet education neither 
fulfilled its external purpose of training skilled work force for the different layers of 
labour, nor did it satisfy its internal idealisation of accommodating preferences and 
abilities. Education was embedded within the broader framework of human resource 
management and, together with individual qualifications and preferences, secondary 
to political and economic priorities materialising in form of the overall 'plan' (Its 
implementation was, as I argue below, incomplete).42 The emphasis on 'corrective 
measures' like vocational guidance in order to cushion the mismatch can be read as 
expressing the restriction of the structural relevance of education. While the market 
logic of job matching allows for considerable autonomy of the education systems in 
democratic countries, this appears counter-intuitive within the logic of planning. In 
practice, certain options of moving on within education were cut off or impossible 
because of bottlenecks (especially towards higher education), which pushed many 
prospective students into work without professional preparation.43 This is not to say 
that education was just an appendix of the ideological manipulation of people, or that 
there were no links between education and work, or that education did not have 
effects that could be rephrased in terms of causalities. It rather means that the non-
availability of matching procedures following market mechanisms prevents outcome 
assumptions established for Western systems (Allmendinger 1989) from being 
effective. On the contrary, the changeability and immanent arbitrariness of 
manipulated (planned, non-market) matching together with all sorts of attempts to 
undermine and complement allocation plans potentially neutralises educational 
experiences and related expectations. A great deal of what is realised by passing 
through education and into labour is, as one could put it in terms of an oxymoron, 
retroactively predetermined. Thus, strong implicit or explicit monodirectional 
assumptions do not necessarily hold, and probably were not developed, for the 
analysis of (socialist) non-market systems.  
The relevance of this observation might as well go beyond the Soviet case and its 
consideration could improve the re-assessment of youth transitions in supposed 
market contexts. Education systems might provide the starting point of transitions 
only with regard to individual time vectors. Yet the predetermination of teleological 
life projects at the individual level in terms of plans and perspectives can have 
corresponding features at the institutional level. In order to reconstruct the actual 
organisation of transitions it might be useful to start at the other end of the line, i.e. at 
the however probable or suggested outcome. One methodological consequence could 
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 For an interesting example of a direct West-East comparison instead of a West-West comparison see 
McLean/Voskresenskaya 1992). 
42
 I also need to contradict Matthews (1982: 202) here who claims that 'the placement of trainees (...) is 
still thought of as an extended function of the educational system.'  
43
 The probably underlying contradictions in the development of Soviet economic policy cannot be 
discussed here. 
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consist in analysing transitions by 'reading them backwards' and inverting the chain of 
causation together with its temporal directionality, possibly based on strongly 
deterministic hypotheses.44 
Second, a reply to the institutional fallacy: As we saw, the institutional 
implementation of the requirements of the 'plan' was far from flawless. Despite and in 
addition to given institutional channels people did change jobs voluntarily and the 
reality of job matching involved considerable activity on the part of individuals; this 
applies to young people as well, though to a lesser extent. In view of these findings it 
seems appropriate to complement the dichotomy of institutional versus individual 
structuration of transitions introduced by Wingens (1999: 260) by a third option, to be 
precise: an alternative perspective on the status of individual action. Due to the 
apparent failure of the mechanisms of institutional structuration individual shares in 
job matching can as well be conceived of as a making up for insufficiencies of the 
system without necessarily questioning the system as such. To put it bluntly, the 
difference is one between using holes and filling gaps. Whether these forms of agency 
qualified as self-realisation undermining, or as substitutive action remedying the 
system remains to be seen as this question cannot be answered without original data. 
What seems crucial is to leave space to the option of interpreting individual action in 
totalitarian settings - 'underlife' in Goffman's terms - not automatically as self-
realisation. Other interpretations may include that of temporary coalitions with 
institutionally suggested programmes or, alternatively, situative remedial agency in 
order to re-establish biographical continuity where institutions failed to provide it 
(Helling 1996, Mayer 2000). Altogether the findings support the call for an 
overcoming of the exclusive institutional focus and a stronger consideration of 
'noninstitutional factors', which can include many other sociologically relevant 
aspects. For instance, stable social networks can establish continuous job entry 
patterns across the transformation (e.g. Ashwin 2006 for Russia). In order to identify 
such factors research needs to be closer to the every day lives of people and their 
biographies. 
Also the findings on this level can be taken further into researching youth transitions 
in both post-communist and capitalist contexts. I restrict myself here to the suggestion 
of some possible questions in order to indicate the direction. A first set of questions 
addresses the latency of habitual knowledge: To what extent do attitudes of 
underliving survive the transformation or are they (gradually) replaced by new 
rationalities? Are patterns of behaviour related to the 'duality of socialist reality' 
disappearing, or are they transformed under the conditions of the new situation? What 
is the status of individual action (subversive or remedial)?45 A second set of questions 
challenges the primacy of institutional analysis: Can we expect the link between 
institutions and employment to be closer when it is established through market forces? 
They might indeed proof more efficient in the overall outcome (i.e. degree of 
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 A variation of ex-post determination of skills-formation by choice or placement (in the sense of 
transition chances) is presented in Estevez-Abe et al. (2001). They discuss how 'the particular 
combination of employment and unemployment protection determines the profile of skills that is likely 
to emerge in an economy. Thus employment protection increases the propensity of workers to invest in 
firm-specific skills, whereas unemployment protection facilitates investment in industry-specific skills. 
The absence of both gives people strong incentives to invest in general skills.' (ibid.; 181-182; original 
emphasis). Although I agree with the authors assumption that individuals have anticipatory and 
proactive capacities, I strongly disagree with their universalisation of rationalities. 
45
 I have discussed related issues on the basis of the example of the persistence of outdated 'knowledge' 
about unemployment available in a post-communist society elsewhere (Reiter 2006). 
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matching) but should altogether allow for even less predictability than job placement. 
The related policy question remains: (How) Can post-Soviet (educational) institutions 
anticipate market matching requirements in order to prepare for them? 
Glossary46 
Goskomstat – State Statistical Committee 
Goskomtrud – State Committee on Labour 
Gosplan – State Planning Committee 
Komsomol – All-Union Leninist communist League of Youth 
Nomenklatura – 'list of names'; listing of mostly responsible state positions together 
with a register of candidates 
Orgnabor – 'organised recruitment'; nation-wide network of offices for recruiting 
labour, primarily manual for work in distant or difficult areas. 
PTU (professionalno-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche) – Vocational or technical school. 
SPTU (srednee professionalno-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche) – Secondary technical 
school. 
SSUZ (srednee spetsialnoe uchebnoe zavedenie) – Secondary special educational 
institutions. 
Tekhnikum – Secondary special educational institutions offering primarily training in 
technical subjects. 
TU (tekhnicheskoe uchilishche) – Technical school. 
VUZ (vysshee uchebnoe zavedenia) – any higher educational institution recognised as 
such by the state. 
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 Terms, abbreviations and transliteration adapted from Matthews (1982). 
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